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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






IVAN G. MCKINNEY, 




PROSECUTOR COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE; JAMES F. AVIGLIANO, 
Prosecutor Passaic County; FRANK LORAN, Detective Clifton Police Dept.; 
SGT. BRAKEN, Clifton Police Depart.; CAPT. ROBERT ROWAN, Clifton Police 
Dept.; DET. KOTORA, Clifton Police Dept.; DET, KAMINSKI, Clifton Police Dept.; 
SGT JOHN DOE, Clifton Police Dept. JANE DOE, Court Administrator Clifton Police;  
HOWARD JOHNSON HOTEL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-03149) 
District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and Possible Dismissal 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit 
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 7, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 






                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Ivan McKinney appeals pro se from a judgment entered against him in a civil 
rights case.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 In June 2008, McKinney, a state prisoner incarcerated at Trenton State Prison in 
New Jersey, began this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court.  His claims 
arise from his arrest in June 2006 for sexual assault of a minor.  McKinney initially faced 
several charges pertaining to two minors, was indicted by a grand jury, and subsequently 
pleaded guilty to sexual assault of one of the two girls.  He originally made § 1983 claims 
against several parties involved in different stages of his investigation and prosecution, 
including a police supervisor, prosecuting attorneys, medical personnel, a grand jury 
witness, and an employee of the hotel where the assault took place.  In addition, he 
challenged the validity of his arrest, prosecution, and incarceration.  McKinney’s second 
amended complaint alleged, among other things, that Robert Bracken (incorrectly 
identified as “Braken”), a police sergeant, deliberately misrepresented material facts 
when obtaining a search warrant for McKinney’s hotel room, and that, because of this, 
McKinney was falsely arrested.  Specifically, McKinney claimed that Bracken’s affidavit 
described McKinney as African-American, despite the earlier description by one of the 
complainants of her assailant (to other parties) as Hispanic, and that probable cause 
therefore did not exist for his arrest.  
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 In order to better understand McKinney’s allegations, the District Court instructed 
him to amend his complaint several times.  During this period, the District Court 
dismissed with prejudice McKinney’s claims against several defendants.  McKinney, for 
his part, added other parties as defendants, including Bracken.  The suit proceeded 
against Bracken alone.  Ultimately, he moved for summary judgment, which the District 
Court granted.  McKinney timely appealed. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  See Long v. Atl. City 
Police Dep’t., 670 F3d 436, 443 (3d Cir. 2012).  We exercise plenary review over an 
order granting summary judgment.  DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Our review over the District Court’s dismissal of several of McKinney’s claims is 
plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may summarily 
affirm when an appeal presents us with no substantial question.  See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6.  
                                              
1 Bracken made crossclaims as well as a counterclaim for his legal fees and costs.  The 
defendants named in Bracken’s crossclaims were never served or made part of the action, 
so the fact that the District Court never formally ruled on the claims poses no obstacle to 
our exercise of appellate jurisdiction.  See Gomez v. Gov’t. of the Virgin Islands, 882 
F.2d 733, 736 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 674 (3d 
Cir. 1976)).  Nor does Bracken’s unresolved counterclaim against McKinney, which 
merely sought attorney’s fees and costs for defending this litigation, as decisions on the 
merits are final despite unresolved claims for attorney’s fees.  See Ray Haluch Gravel Co. 
v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emp’rs, 134 S. 
Ct. 773, 777 (2014). 




 A.  Earlier District Court orders granting motions to dismiss 
 McKinney’s first two complaints stated a host of claims under § 1983 against 
numerous defendants, who twice moved to dismiss.  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Blanket assertions and 
conclusory statements by themselves do not suffice to show plausibility.  See Renfro v. 
Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011). 
  1.  Claims dismissed in the September 3, 2008, order 
 The District Court properly rejected Davis’ claim against the Passaic County 
Prosecutor’s Office.  See Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, 769 F.3d 
850, 855 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that New Jersey County prosecutor’s offices are 
considered state agencies for § 1983 purposes when fulfilling their law enforcement and 
investigative – as opposed to administrative – roles).  Further, the District Court correctly 
held that Defendants Roby and Kane were immune from suit for their actions as 
prosecutors in McKinney’s criminal case.  Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  The District Court also correctly dismissed McKinney’s claims that the 
hospital and one of its supervisors allowed treatment practices that contributed to his 
conviction.  Among other things, McKinney did not allege facts establishing that either 
party had the requisite personal involvement with the victim’s treatment.  See Rode v. 
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Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  More fundamentally, McKinney’s 
allegations against Defendant Russell, the hospital employee who personally examined 
the victim, sounded only in negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983.  See 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).  McKinney’s claim for immediate release was 
properly denied as a plaintiff may not use § 1983 to challenge the fact of his confinement.  
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).   
 The District Court dismissed McKinney’s malicious prosecution claims under 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), but McKinney’s criminal case was still pending 
at the time.  Heck does not apply to “an anticipated future conviction.” 2  Wallace v. Kato, 
549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007).  The Supreme Court has noted that a proper course of action in 
a situation like McKinney’s would be for the District Court to stay the adjudication of the 
plaintiff’s claim until the end of his criminal proceedings.3  See id.  At that time, if the 
result was a determination of guilt, the District Court would then dismiss the claim under 
                                              
2 Further, to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show 
that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended 
in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the 
defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; 
and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure 
as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 
(3d Cir.2003).  Because McKinney’s case was ongoing at the time of the District Court 
order, he would not have then been able to satisfy the second element of malicious 
prosecution.  See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 190 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
3 The fact that McKinney pleaded guilty to only one charge as part of a bargain with 
prosecutors does not imply a favorable termination of his criminal case, as is required to 
make out a claim of malicious prosecution.  See Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 580 
(3d Cir.1996)) (“A prosecutor's decision to drop charges as part of a compromise with the 
accused does not amount to a ‘favorable termination[.]’”). 
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Heck.  Id.; see also Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 187–188 (3d Cir. 
2010).  As McKinney pleaded guilty to the sexual assault charge in criminal court before 
the termination of his case in District Court, thus rendering his claim Heck-barred, we 
conclude that the District Court’s earlier, premature dismissal of this claim was harmless 
error.  See Quinn v. St. Louis Cnty., 653 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2011). 
  2.  Claims dismissed in the January 16, 2009, order 
 The District Court correctly dismissed four claims in McKinney’s first amended 
complaint.  McKinney claimed that “Chief John Doe Farrari” (Bracken’s superior) should 
be liable for Bracken’s actions, but liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a 
theory of respondeat superior.  See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.  As the District Court 
concluded, McKinney’s claim against “Jane Doe, Howard Johnson Hotel Clerk,” for 
failing to give him a copy of the search warrant, failed because she was not a state actor.  
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  McKinney’s claims about the grand jury 
testimony of Defendant Loran failed because Loran enjoys immunity for the content of 
that testimony.  See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329, 341-43 (1983).  The District 
Court correctly dismissed McKinney’s slander and libel claims as time-barred, as they 
were filed outside the applicable one-year statute of limitations.  See N.J. Stat. Ann § 
2A:14-3. 
 B.  District Court’s September 17, 2014, summary judgment order 
 We now turn to the District Court’s order that summarily disposed of McKinney’s 
remaining claims.  Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light 
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most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  Here, McKinney has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the District Court’s decision either on the lawfulness of the search warrant or regarding 
the basis for his arrest. 
  1.  Unlawful search claim 
  McKinney argued that Bracken made false statements in his affidavit, thereby 
invalidating the search warrant for his hotel room.  A search warrant is valid if supported 
by probable cause that particular contraband or evidence will be found in a particular 
place.  Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  To defeat probable cause, a plaintiff must 
show that misstatements in a warrant affidavit were “material, or necessary, to the finding 
of probable cause,” and were made “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth.”  Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(internal citations omitted).4    
                                              
4 Section 1983 claims for unreasonable searches and seizures are not categorically barred 
by Heck.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.  Here, McKinney’s claims, if proven, do not 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.  McKinney never disputed that he was 
in the hotel room with the girls.  In fact, he admitted that he had “a statutory rape 
relationship” with one of them.  Even if McKinney could prevail on his claim that the 
search of his hotel room was unreasonable, enough undisputed evidence exists to prevent 
the invalidation of his conviction.  Accordingly, his unreasonable search claim is not 
Heck-barred.  See id. 
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 McKinney claimed that Bracken deliberately misstated his race when obtaining 
the search warrant for his hotel room.  He also claimed that Bracken at one point falsely 
described the second minor present as an “eye-witness,” when, in another part of his 
affidavit, Bracken stated that she was not in the room when the sexual assault took place.  
There is no dispute, however, that the minor was present during the commission of a 
number of illegal acts for which McKinney was originally charged (such as giving 
alcohol to minors), though McKinney later pleaded guilty only to the sexual assault 
charge.  She was, therefore, an eye-witness to at least some of the events that Bracken 
described in his affidavit.  In addition, as the District Court correctly noted, Bracken 
sought only a search warrant for a specific hotel room, which both the victim and witness 
identified as the scene of the assault.  “The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to 
describe only ‘the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized’, not the 
persons from whom things will be seized.”  United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155 
n.15 (1974) (quoting United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1972)); see 
also United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that search 
warrants are directed at property, not at persons).  McKinney’s race was therefore not a 
material fact with respect to the search warrant for the hotel room.  See United States v. 
Long, 774 F.3d 653, 658-59 (10th Cir. 2014).  Notably, McKinney did not dispute the 
truthfulness of Bracken’s statements regarding the location of the hotel room, which is 
the pertinent material fact in determining whether the warrant was based on probable 
cause.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in concluding that the errors or false 
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statements alleged by McKinney were not necessary to the finding of probable cause.  
See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000); Tehfe, 722 F.2d at 1117-18.     
  2.  False arrest claim 
 McKinney’s claim that Bracken had no probable cause to arrest him also fails.5  
To hold a police officer civilly liable for false arrest, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts 
to support the inference that “‘no reasonable competent officer’ would conclude that 
probable cause exists.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).  “Probable cause exists whenever reasonably 
trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are 
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been 
committed by the person being arrested.”  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  A positive identification by a victim witness is usually sufficient alone to 
establish probable cause.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790.  Notably, too, indictment by a grand 
jury, as here, generally constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause.  Rose v. 
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989).  Here, because McKinney rented the hotel room 
during the period that the assault took place and was independently identified from a 
                                              
5 This claim is also not categorically barred by Heck.  Compare Montgomery v. De 
Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (“claims for false arrest and false 
imprisonment are not the type of claims contemplated by the Court in Heck which 
necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction or sentence”), with Gibson v. 
Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding Heck rule applies because 
the only evidence supporting conviction was found pursuant to a constitutional violation 
that was the subject of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim).  Here, because ample other evidence 
existed in support of McKinney’s arrest, Heck does not apply. 
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photo array by each minor involved in the incident, probable cause existed for his arrest.  
The District Court was therefore correct in granting summary judgment to Bracken 
regarding the false arrest claim. 
IV. 
 For the reasons given, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
